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Book Reviews 
Neo-orthodoxy in Academic Freedom 
FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM.  
By Matthew W. Finkin and Robert C. Post.  New Haven, Connecticut 
and London, United Kingdom: Yale University Press, 2009.  263 pages.  
$27.50. 
SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME.  By Stanley Fish.  New York, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008.  189 pages.  $19.95. 
Reviewed by J. Peter Byrne* 
A robust system of academic freedom protects the most important 
values and functions of higher education.  The scholar’s freedom to choose 
topics and methods of investigation and the teacher’s ability to shape 
assignments and pedagogy, subject to the criteria of their fields and the 
evaluation of their peers, have provided the necessary conditions for the 
intellectual success of American higher education.  Yet, how poorly 
understood and feebly defended has been this indispensable norm of aca-
demic life!  Smug indifference of professors, extravagant claims by 
defenders, bad faith or paranoid criticisms by outsiders, epistemological 
skepticism, and the boom and bust economic fortunes of our many and vari-
ous colleges and universities have combined to cast a pall of doubt and 
distrust over this signal achievement of our intellectual culture. 
These two books, so different in tone and moral orientation, embrace a 
common strategy: they protect academic freedom against contemporary 
threats by grounding it in its original function of protecting professorial con-
trol over the evaluation of teaching and scholarship.  Stanley Fish, literary 
theorist, Milton scholar, polymath academic controversialist, dean, and now 
NYTimes.com columnist, argues colorfully and vigorously for professors to 
fulfill only their jobs of instruction and scholarship, leaving political persua-
sion and moral guidance to others, or at least to their own spare time.  
Matthew Finkin and Robert Post, eminent law professors and veteran leaders 
in the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), calmly 
explain and defend the AAUP’s approach to protecting the academic 
freedom of professors through investigation and judgment.  Both books take 
as foundational the AAUP’s famous 1915 Declaration of Principles on 
 
 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  Thanks for helpful comments to 
Robin West, Karen Byrne, and participants at a summer workshop at Georgetown Law. 
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Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,1 although they take different 
interpretative stances toward the 1915 Declaration’s prim defense of profes-
sorial competence against meddling trustees.  Both books react to external 
critics and gesture toward internal reforms of our vast, wonderful, and para-
doxical structure of higher education.  I term their positions “neo-orthodoxy” 
because they reground academic freedom in the original AAUP tradition, 
updating its rationale to some extent for current intellectual assumptions and 
defending it against rival contemporary accounts and external criticisms.2  As 
will be seen, I largely agree with this move but have concerns about how to 
give it effect within the law. 
This Review seeks to both celebrate and criticize these books.  
Curiously, these books that praise the norms of scholarship cannot be 
considered themselves to constitute scholarship.  Though smart and learned, 
they do not place themselves within the existing literature or confront recal-
citrant data.  Rather, they make arguments to persuade general readers, even 
if ones within the academy.  Indeed, they stimulate a discussion that all who 
care about universities should join.  This Review first provides some back-
ground about academic freedom and the tradition these books revive.  
Second, it assesses how well they address internal doubts and external criti-
cisms.  Third, it considers the implications of their arguments for ongoing 
and looming questions about the constitutional status of academic freedom.  
My goal, like theirs, is to strengthen academic freedom for an uncertain 
future. 
I. Academic Freedom as a Professional Norm 
Academic freedom exists both as a reasonably determinate academic 
norm and as some kind of constitutional right.  The norm has grown from the 
crucial pronouncements of the AAUP and the commitment to it by nearly 
every entity within the world of higher education.  University faculty, 
administrators, and trustees largely have internalized this ethic of academic 
freedom, however shaky their understanding of its premises and reach.  
 
1. Finkin and Post print an abridged version of the 1915 Declaration as an appendix to their 
book.  AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE (1915) [hereinafter 1915 DECLARATION], as reprinted in 
MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM app.1 (2009).  For convenience, I will cite to that version in this Review.  The 
complete 1915 Declaration is published in the AAUP collection commonly known as the 
“Redbook.”  AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE (1915), reprinted in POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS app.1 
(10th ed. 2006) [hereinafter REDBOOK]. 
2. The analogy I have in mind is the neo-orthodox theology associated with Reinhold Niebuhr, 
which sought at once to fend off fundamentalists on one side and those liberals on the other who 
dissolved the distinctive perspective of the Christian tradition.  See GARY DORRIEN, THE MAKING 
OF AMERICAN MODERN LIBERAL THEOLOGY: IDEALISM, REALISM, AND MODERNITY, 1900–1950, 
at 459–64 (2003) (illustrating how Niebuhr distinguished his position from both the liberal Chicago 
school and conservative Barthian positions). 
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Committee A of the AAUP continues to expound its meaning through occa-
sional statements but even more importantly through investigations and 
reports about specific complaints.3  The core of the scholarly norm of aca-
demic freedom is that nonacademics such as trustees and administrators 
should refrain from interfering with scholarship and teaching, and leave 
evaluation of academic quality to scholarly peers (i.e., other professors pri-
marily within the relevant discipline).  The individual faculty member thus 
enjoys freedom to choose subjects and methods for research, publication, and 
teaching, constrained primarily by the expectations and structures of the pro-
fession.  The norm presumes that the function of a scholar is to search for 
truth, which will redound to the benefit of society at large, and that lay inter-
ference for political or other motives will distort or derail the scholarly 
enterprise.  These general propositions command near universal allegiance, 
but the application of them to marginal cases generates disagreement and 
sometimes passion. 
The constitutional right has been more obscure and accepted only 
gingerly.  It dates only to Sweezy v. New Hampshire4 in 1957, where the 
Supreme Court invalidated on cryptic grounds a contempt conviction against 
a visiting classroom lecturer for refusing to answer questions posed by the 
state attorney general about the political content of his lecture.  The Court 
stressed, however, the “grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion 
into the intellectual life of a university.”5  Primarily, constitutional academic 
freedom has shielded the university as an institution from government med-
dling with core academic decisions, which has protected the autonomous 
operation of the norm within universities.6  Commentators disagree about 
whether the Constitution incorporates the norm itself so that aggrieved 
faculty can seek resolution of disputes with their institutions about the 
substance of academic freedom in federal courts.7  This question has become 
much more pressing since the Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos8 
 
3. REDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1. 
4. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
5. Id. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
6. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 
YALE L.J. 251, 311 (1989) (“In the last decade, the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning academic 
freedom have protected principally and expressly a First Amendment right of the university itself—
understood in its corporate capacity—largely to be free from government interference in the 
performance of core educational functions.”); Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two 
Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1265, 1322 (1988) (concluding 
that the centerpiece of the constitutional definition of academic freedom is institutional autonomy). 
7. Compare David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” 
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 280 (1990) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s designation of institutional academic freedom as a First 
Amendment right does not support the inference that the Court has rejected a constitutional right of 
individual professors against “trustees, administrators, and faculty peers”), with Byrne, supra 
note 6, at 329 (defining the constitutional incarnation of academic freedom such that it includes only 
the core academic affairs of the university itself and not the autonomy of individual faculty). 
8. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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that the First Amendment does not protect government employees against 
employer reprisals for speech within their official duties, while postponing 
consideration whether such a rule should apply to university teaching and 
scholarship.9 
Both books under review here address academic freedom as a norm or 
ethical principle more than as a constitutional matter.  They offer almost no 
analysis of legal or structural issues.  But they undertake their expositions in 
light of these legal uncertainties.  After engaging them on their own terms, I 
will consider the implications their approaches have for outstanding legal 
controversies. 
The centrality of the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration for any discussion of 
academic freedom has long been recognized.  Academic freedom was in 
some real sense invented and fostered by the AAUP, initially an organization 
of academic elites formed primarily for that purpose.10  The 1915 
Declaration addressed the situation of emerging universities at the beginning 
of the twentieth century: professors employing sophisticated, modern re-
search methodologies sought professional stature in institutions legally 
controlled by lay trustees sometimes suspicious of the political or religious 
tendencies of modern thought.  It conceived of knowledge as objective and 
politically neutral.  Good progressives of their era, the authors of the 1915 
Declaration founded academic freedom upon the positive structures of 
scientific inquiry, arguing that professors should present their research either 
in scholarship or the classroom without influence from untoward motives and 
be evaluated by other professionals solely on the academic value of their 
work.  Trustees were admonished to treat the university as a public trust and 
refrain from injecting their political or other ideological prejudices into aca-
demic matters.  Public opinion was treated as a threat to the advancement of 
knowledge, particularly at state universities.  Universities were to be 
“inviolable refuge[s] from such tyranny” and “intellectual experiment 
station[s], where new ideas may germinate.”11 
The 1915 Declaration did not view academic freedom as establishing a 
personal freedom of expression for professors, but only the right to engage in 
professional speech within a discipline without extraneous restraint. “The 
claim to freedom of teaching is made in the interest of the integrity and of the 
progress of scientific inquiry; it is, therefore, only those who carry on their 
work in the temper of the scientific inquirer who may justly assert this 
claim.”12  Personal views of the professor, divorced from disciplinary 
 
9. Id. at 425. 
10. The authors adapted ideas current in Germany, just as did developing research universities 
more broadly, to the quite different conditions of higher education in the United States.  RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 385–89 (1955). 
11. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 172. 
12. Id. at 173. 
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expertise, or expressed in the classroom in an educationally incompetent 
manner would not count, although speech by professors outside their profes-
sional sphere was gingerly extended protection so long as they refrained from 
“hasty or unverified or exaggerated statements,” as well as “intemperate or 
sensational modes of expression.”13  The 1915 Declaration predated any 
modern First Amendment doctrine and applied equally to public and private 
schools. 
The 1915 Declaration anticipated that its academic goals would be 
accomplished by internal structural reforms, primarily peer review and 
tenure.  The growing professionalism of academic life and increasing com-
petition for eminence pushed leading universities to incorporate these 
reforms and the scholarly aspirations that inspired them.  Acceptance of the 
AAUP position in fact soon reached a tipping point so that failure to formally 
embrace or adhere to its core marked a school as marginal or maverick.  In 
1940, the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges issued the 1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, a brief, joint 
statement of basic principles, which soon gained approval by hundreds of 
educational associations and has been incorporated in many faculty 
handbooks.14 
Although the model of higher education embedded in the 1915 
Declaration and the 1940 Statement prevailed through midcentury, it began 
to show strain under the dramatic changes affecting higher education 
thereafter.  The higher education sector grew massively, both in the number 
and diversity of students and employees, as well as in the subjects taught and 
researched, and in the economic significance and social prestige of university 
degrees.  The federal government became far more enmeshed in higher edu-
cation financing and regulation.  As the size of the faculty has grown, the 
percentage covered by tenure systems has decreased.  In all, universities have 
become far more the loci of political struggles, through McCarthyism, the 
Sixties, revolutions in racial and sexual diversity, and the culture wars.  The 
traditional focus of the 1915 Declaration on the relations between faculty 
and trustees could seem quaint compared to new claims, frequently in court, 
about government interventions, political protests, affirmative action, and 
politicization of departments.  The AAUP has developed thoughtful state-
ments on many of these issues, but it has become one voice among many, 
distracted by unionization disputes, and weakened by internal dissension.15  
Both books largely ignore changes in the size, scope, and social context of 
 
13. Id. at 177–78. 
14. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS (1970) [hereinafter 1940 
STATEMENT], reprinted in REDBOOK, supra note 1, at 3. 
15. See Robin Wilson, The AAUP, 92 and Ailing, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), 
June 8, 2007, available at http://chronicle.com/article/The-AAUP-92Ailing/3053 (discussing the 
split in membership opinions regarding the desirability of the AAUP continuing to function as a 
union). 
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higher education, and concentrate on more direct conceptual challenges to 
academic freedom.16 
Both books embrace the essence of the 1915 Declaration, understanding 
scholarship as the production of knowledge shaped by relevant disciplines.  
Fish claims to be “merely rephrasing” the 1915 Declaration.17  He writes, 
“My deflationary definition of academic freedom is narrowly professional 
rather than philosophical, and its narrowness, I contend, enables it to provide 
clear answers to questions . . . blurred by more ambitious definitions.”18  
Finkin and Post’s whole argument builds on the 1915 Declaration, which 
they describe as the first and “arguably the greatest” articulation of the pro-
fessional norm of academic freedom.19  They both understand teaching to be 
enabling students to consider the truth of complex ideas using critical 
methods.  Finkin and Post write, “[I]t is precisely the pedagogical purpose of 
higher education to introduce critical distance between students and their 
own ideas.”20  Fish claims, “If you’re not in the pursuit-of-truth business, you 
should not be in the university.”21 
Finkin and Post provide a lawyerly account of what the AAUP has 
considered to be academic freedom, giving a clear if unoriginal account of 
the 1915 Declaration, emphasizing the context in which it was adopted, and 
then summarizing investigation reports by Committee A that bear upon the 
controversies of our time.  They describe this accumulated body of 
Committee A reports as “the most authoritative available source for the 
professional meaning of academic freedom today.”22  Their distillation of 
these reports may be the greatest contribution of the book.  There is a sub-
stantial amount of nuanced wisdom buried among lengthy, painstaking 
accounts of otherwise forgotten academic imbroglios.  The reports them-
selves are not readily accessible, having been published in old issues of 
AAUP publications, so the authors are engaged in a kind of salvage opera-
tion.  The approach and principles set forth could guide thinking about 
academic freedom even if Committee A were to disappear.  Such a 
distillation, however, obscures the centrality of Committee A’s factual 
inquiry and its focus on structural remedies for institutional failures, usually 
recommending greater faculty participation at some decision point. 
Finkin and Post accomplish two objectives here.  First, they present an 
unusually comprehensive account of the norm of academic freedom by 
describing Committee A decisions on difficult points.  In this they resemble 
 
16. See generally Andrew Delbanco, The Universities in Trouble, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 14, 
2009, at 36, 38 (analyzing how the financial crisis has impacted higher education and magnified 
“the widening disparity of wealth and opportunity in American society”). 
17. STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME 80 (2008). 
18. Id. at 16. 
19. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 30. 
20. Id. at 105. 
21. FISH, supra note 17, at 20. 
22. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 52. 
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common law treatise authors extracting rules of law from the reports of 
cases.  Second, they convey the impression that the AAUP approach employs 
nuanced and dispassionate wisdom remote from contemporary ideological 
divides.  The AAUP principles thus gain an aura of authoritative objectivity 
because they transcend today’s partisanship. 
Their approach can be illustrated by an important example: they offer 
several cases concerning the limits on faculty discretion to introduce into the 
classroom controversial matter having no relation to the subject matter of the 
course.  In one case, a professor at Evansville College frequently referred to 
contemporary political disputes to illustrate logical fallacies, conveying in 
the process a personal aversion to President Truman and an allegiance to 
Henry Wallace.23  Committee A rejected claims that the professor used his 
philosophy classroom for propaganda because his statements were in aid of 
stimulating discussion on matters properly within the sphere of the class.24  It 
wrote: 
[J]udgments concerning the handling of controversial material will 
frequently depend not so much on the what as the how. . . .  The total 
effect of what a teacher says on controversial subjects in the classroom 
depends a great deal upon the manner, the spirit in which he says it, 
and the emphasis he places upon it.  It depends also upon the previous 
existence of a relationship of confidence and understanding between 
the teacher and his students.25 
Finkin and Post then relate the fate of another professor teaching a class 
in the history of American foreign policy at Ohio State, who reacted to the 
assassination of Martin Luther King by dropping his topic, speaking for 
forty-five minutes about the assassination, and then burning his draft card.26  
Committee A concluded that the professor had “no right to commandeer the 
class for a ‘teach-in’ on his personal political views.”27  Based on these and 
other cases, Finkin and Post argue for an underlying principle: 
A pedagogical intervention bears a “relation” to a subject under 
consideration if it is educationally relevant. . . .  The standard is 
whether material from a seemingly foreign field of study illuminates 
the subject matter under scrutiny, bearing in mind that the overall 
design of a modern curriculum is to provide a general education, 
which is to say, the ability to think systemically and in an independent 
and informed manner.28 
 
23. Id. at 97. 
24. Id. at 98. 
25. Id. at 98–99. 
26. Id. at 99. 
27. Id. at 100. 
28. Id. at 93. 
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The authors thus treat Committee A decisions and opinions as authority.  
Their role is to explain the underlying principles, which they present as 
having normative weight. 
Fish, by contrast, argues passionately for a vision of teaching that he 
terms, “academicizing.”29  He would limit the aspirations of the university 
teacher to training students in the intellectual practices pertinent to their sub-
ject and exclude all extraneous ideological debate. 
College and university teachers can (legitimately) do two things: 
(1) introduce students to bodies of knowledge and traditions of inquiry 
that had not previously been part of their experience; and (2) equip 
those same students with the analytical skills—of argument, statistical 
modeling, laboratory procedure—that will enable them to move 
confidently within those traditions and to engage in independent 
research after a course is over.30 
Fish argues that teachers should not attempt more than this; in particular, 
they should not attempt to guide or instruct students to follow moral or po-
litical principles, “tasks that belong properly to other agents—to preachers, 
political leaders, therapists, and gurus.”31  He denies that teachers have 
competence for these roles and, more persuasively, that doing so can embroil 
academia in controversy. 
Fish’s account of academic freedom builds upon this “deflationary” or 
minimalist account of the role of the university teacher and tracks a narrow 
reading of the 1915 Declaration.  He argues that only academics can have 
competent views on issues within academic disciplines, so lay constraints on 
genuinely academic work can only impair the discipline and are as illegiti-
mate as they are unnecessary.32  He characterizes academic freedom as “the 
freedom to do one’s academic job without interference from external constit-
uencies like legislators, boards of trustees, donors, and even parents.”33  On 
the other hand, professors have no warrant for ever discussing issues outside 
their subjects in class and no special protection for doing so outside.  “[O]ne 
violates academic freedom by deciding to set aside academic purposes for 
others thought to be more noble or urgent.”34  While Fish seems largely 
uninterested in issues of institutional design, he seems to feel that professors 
who stay within the lines he draws should be protected absolutely, while 
those who go outside them can and should be checked by institutional 
authorities. 
While Finkin and Post articulate standards that can encompass different 
approaches and circumstances, Fish writes from personal conviction to 
 
29. FISH, supra note 17, at 26. 
30. Id. at 12–13. 
31. Id. at 169. 
32. Id. at 80. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 81. 
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persuade individuals to agree with his approach.  Their differences can be 
seen in their disagreement about whether a professor may advocate personal 
views on controversial subjects in class.  Fish argues never; he would limit 
teachers to analysis or contextualization of arguments advanced by others.35 
If an idea or a policy is presented as a candidate for allegiance—aided 
by the instructor, students are to decide where they stand on the 
matter—then the classroom has been appropriated for partisan 
purposes.  But if an idea or a policy is subjected to a certain kind of 
interrogation—what is its history?  how has it changed over time?  
who are its prominent proponents?  what are the arguments for and 
against it?  with what other policies is it usually packaged?—then its 
partisan thrust will have been blunted, for it will have become an 
object of analysis rather than an object of affection.36 
While he claims to draw a workable line between teaching about a 
subject and using it as an occasion for political mobilization, he advances the 
extreme view that, for example, neither faculty nor students addressing the 
ethics of withdrawing life support from a vegetative patient or assessing the 
Bush presidency should advocate positions on the issues but instead should 
examine the nature of the question and of the arguments advanced by 
others.37 
[A]s this is happening—as the subject is being academicized—there 
will be less and less pressure in this class to come down on one side or 
the other and more and more pressure to describe accurately and fully 
the historical and philosophical antecedents of both sides. . . .  Not 
only is it possible to depoliticize issues that have obvious political 
content; it is easy.38 
Finkin and Post largely agree with Fish, writing that “it is precisely the 
pedagogical purpose of higher education to introduce critical distance be-
tween students and their own ideas.”39  They argue, however, that faculty 
should “be free to structure and discuss classroom material as they deem 
most pedagogically effective, so long as they do not indoctrinate their stu-
dents or violate professional standards of pedagogical relevance and 
substantive competence.”40  They explicitly accept that strong faculty advo-
cacy on controversial subjects in the classroom meets “the heuristic necessity 
of actively arousing student attention and interest.”41  Finkin and Post start 
 
35. Id. at 24–25. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 27–28.  He argues that what makes great ethical writers, such as Plato or William 
James, “worth studying” is not their substantive views but “the verbal, architectonic, or 
argumentative skills they display.”  Id. at 102–03.  Plato and James certainly would be disappointed. 
38. Id. at 28. 
39. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 105. 
40. Id. at 104. 
41. Id. at 94.  Finkin and Post also quote from an earlier article: 
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from the same point that students should not be indoctrinated, but they move 
to the broader principle that university faculty should teach students to think 
for themselves.  They claim that the 1915 Declaration presupposes a partic-
ular “pedagogical purpose . . . to instill in students the mature independence 
of mind that characterizes successful adulthood.”42  They argue, however, 
that different professors properly advance this goal in very different ways: 
some refrain from revealing their own views; others state them forcefully and 
invite debate. “It is difficult if not dangerous to attempt to lay down bright 
and abstract rules because the quality of the connection that professors forge 
with their students depends so heavily on individual style and personality.”43 
These excerpts capture both the shared values and different approaches 
of these two books.  Both view higher education as liberal education, which 
teaches students to think carefully and competently for themselves.  Fish 
argues emphatically in the first person for drawing strict limits around 
academic competence.  His prose snaps and sizzles, but sacrifices nuance for 
vigor.  He lacks any institutional perspective or tolerance for divergence 
from his precepts.  Finkin and Post, on the other hand, present themselves as 
the impersonal expositors of an old and successful tradition.  Because they 
wisely view academic freedom as a regulatory norm that must apply in vari-
ous contexts, they seek to provide flexible standards that embrace a range of 
pedagogical approaches.  They proscribe teaching that amounts to 
“indoctrination” rather than prescribe how everyone should teach.  While 
their arguments shine less brightly than Fish’s, they also seem more sensible 
and workable.  They seem to address Fish directly when they argue that 
judgments about inappropriate teaching are “necessarily contextual” and 
“cannot be governed by mechanical and inflexible rules.”44 
II. Considering Postmodernism 
One project both books share is burying the notion that the 
epistemological skepticism associated with postmodernism threatens 
academic freedom.  The authors of the 1915 Declaration expressed conven-
tional views of their time about the objectivity of the scientific method and 
the solidity and neutrality of the knowledge gained thereby.  Peer review 
insulated from external political control was justified by the commitment to 
 
There is no academic norm that prohibits scholarship from communicating definite 
viewpoints about important and controversial questions, like democracy, human rights, 
or the welfare state.  Faculty must be free to communicate these viewpoints in their 
pedagogy.  Political passion is in fact the engine that drives some of the best 
scholarship and teaching[,] . . . and this is particularly true in the humanities and social 
sciences. 
Id. at 202 n.1 (quoting Robert C. Post, Academic Freedom and the “Intifada Curriculum,” 
ACADEME, May–June 2003, at 16, 19). 
42. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 61. 
43. Id. at 82. 
44. Id. at 99. 
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truth of those trained in disciplinary methods, as compared with the self-
interest and ideology of outsiders.45  As theorists have argued persuasively 
about the situatedness of understanding and the influence of convention and 
social power in knowledge,46 the confidence of the AAUP pioneers has 
seemed naïve.  Some powerful voices have argued that academic freedom 
needs to get along without reliance on any claim that scholarship advances 
knowledge toward an external goal of truth.47  Defenders of academic free-
dom have worried whether academic freedom can survive without some 
persuasive warrant that scholarly knowledge rests on something other than 
institutional inertia.48  These concerns have been heightened by campaigns 
from the right demanding that faculties reflect political balance and diversity 
of viewpoint; their arguments often reflect at least tactical appropriations of 
postmodern skepticism. 
Finkin and Post worry that such skepticism about the bases for 
disciplinary criteria and a concomitant concern for those who dissent from 
the prevailing paradigms has pushed understandings of academic freedom 
away from protection of peer review and toward protection of individual 
voices.  They express the fear that such “antinomianism” will erode public 
respect for faculty self-governance. “The external defense of academic free-
dom will collapse if faculty lose faith in the professional norms necessary to 
define and generate knowledge.”49  Their response to this threat is pragmatic; 
universities should adhere to an understanding of academic freedom based on 
protection of peer review because only that will nurture public faith in 
 
45. The 1915 Declaration exhibits at least two attitudes that lack credibility today: expansive 
optimism about what the social sciences can discover, and the claim that social scientists deserve 
deference because they stand apart from political interests.  “[I]f the universities are to render any 
such service toward the right solution of the social problems of the future, it is the first essential that 
the scholars who carry on the work of the universities shall not be in a position of dependence upon 
the favor of any social class or group, that the disinterestedness and impartiality of their inquiries 
and their conclusions shall be, so far as is humanly possible, beyond the reach of suspicion.”  1915 
DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 169–70. 
46. The literature on this is voluminous, but the key work is THOMAS S. KUHN, THE 
STRUCTURES OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). 
47. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Academic Norms, Contemporary Challenges: A Reply to Robert 
Post on Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 107, 126–28 
(Beshara Doumani ed., 2006) (arguing that the external-truth-driven conception of academic 
freedom is simply one of a competing pool of professional norms, many of which are dissenting and 
all of which must be subject to criticism and debate); Richard Rorty, Does Academic Freedom Have 
Philosophical Presuppositions?, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 21, 21–27 (Louis 
Menand ed., 1996) (arguing that belief in an objective truth is not presupposed by the practices of 
academic freedom and that adopting sociopolitical justifications for academic freedom will lead to 
more honest and clear-headed inquiry than currently exists under the epistemological justifications). 
48. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 286–88 (noting that if, as some have argued, academic speech 
on any subject is merely political speech then academic freedom would be only the result of inertia 
and traditionalism); David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism?, 86 CAL. 
L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1998) (reviewing THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 47) 
(questioning whether academic freedom can survive without its historic epistemological support and 
arguing that the essays in Menand’s book fail to provide a satisfactory answer). 
49. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 60. 
154 Texas Law Review [Vol. 88:143 
 
professional norms.  Moreover, universities actually have structures of peer 
review and historically have acted as if these structures advance knowledge.  
While Finkin and Post acknowledge that the public will support such faculty 
prerogatives only if they “over time produce credible forms of knowledge,” 
they seem to argue for internal adherence to these norms primarily to 
promote external deference to them.50 
Practically speaking, I believe that they are correct.  I have written: “If 
[academic] speech is believed to have no autonomy from political power, 
political power will not long brook contradictory speech.”51  But it is disap-
pointing that Finkin and Post do not offer a more substantive defense of the 
pursuit of truth as the basis for academic freedom.  Their argument rests too 
heavily on the self-interest of the academic community in keeping public 
interference at bay.  They seem to argue that we need to hold onto ideas of 
truth in order to protect academic freedom, whereas we need academic free-
dom because all scholarship presupposes a goal of truer knowledge that may 
conflict with prevailing ideology.52 
Scholarship, in fact, has largely digested postmodernism.  Chastened 
from absolute claims or assumptions about objective truth and alert to 
methodological limitations, scholars continue to attempt to give more 
satisfying accounts of the problems recognized within or among their disci-
plines.  On the one hand, scholars do not need conclusive philosophical 
accounts of what truth means in scholarly pursuits to recognize that careful 
and accurate work can improve existing accounts of issues without regard to 
their political tendency.  Fish writes that one can fully accept postmodernism 
and “still hold firmly to judgments of truth, accuracy, correctness, and error 
as they are made in the precincts of some particular realm of inquiry.”53  On 
the other, contemporary philosophers do provide impressive nonfoundation-
alist accounts of knowledge that emphasize the very ethical practices of 
honesty, accuracy, and critique that characterize scholarly work.54  It is hard 
to see why we should lose confidence because we view knowledge as 
 
50. Id. at 61. 
51. Byrne, supra note 6, at 287. 
52. See J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 125 
(2004) (“[I]t seems likely that such institutional arrangements will and, perhaps, should decay 
without the animating vitality of hard truth as a goal and test for academic discourse.”). 
53. FISH, supra note 17, at 134. 
54. See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS (2002) (reconciling the 
tension between demanding truthfulness while rejecting notions of absolute truth, and providing an 
account of knowledge that relies heavily on the importance of accuracy and sincerity); MICHAEL 
WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO EPISTEMOLOGY (2001) 
(arguing for a contextualist theory of knowledge, which recognizes that knowledge arises in 
community endeavors such as academic disciplines).  I discuss the importance of this work for 
academic freedom in Byrne, supra note 52, at 124–29.  Arguments for epistemic relativism, which 
posits that claims to truth can be validated only within epistemic systems that themselves cannot be 
justified by external criteria, are skewered in PAUL A. BOGHASSIAN, FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE: 
AGAINST RELATIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 81–110 (2006). 
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provisional rather than absolute, or disciplinary criteria as revisable rather 
than final.  On the contrary, this “pragmatic realism” about knowledge makes 
persuasive a neo-orthodox account of academic freedom based upon the 
value of professional standards.55 
Fish grasps concerns about postmodernism by both lapels.  He 
recognizes that external pressure groups for political balance both criticize 
and rely upon postmodernism.  His main argument, however, is that episte-
mological skepticism is irrelevant to the truth value of scholarship and 
reflects only minor adjustments in certain disciplinary norms.  Fish long has 
argued for the primacy of disciplinary norms in providing the necessary self-
understandings of any intellectual practice.56  Here, he gets traction through 
his larger strategy of minimizing the claims about what teaching or scholar-
ship can accomplish. 
[O]bjectivity is just another name for trying to get something right in a 
particular area of inquiry. . . .  [T]he researcher begins in some context 
of practice, with its received authorities, sacred texts, exemplary 
achievements, and generally accepted benchmarks, and from within 
the perspective (and not within the perspective of a general theory) of 
that context—thick, interpersonal, densely elaborated—judges 
something to be true or inaccurate, reasonable or irrational, and so 
on.57 
Fish thus deploys his academic minimalism, which separates academic 
practices from any larger social value.  He argues that the conventional, 
historically situated criteria of merit operative in any academic discipline 
have no necessary relation to any broader notion of truth.  Invocations of 
general truth or morality by outsiders are simply irrelevant to the specific 
practices and professional criteria of insiders.  Indeed, he goes so far as to 
claim (implausibly) that “[t]here is no necessary or even likely correlation 
between the political views of a faculty member and the views he or she may 
have on a disputed issue in an academic field.”58  Moreover, he argues rather 
subtly that deconstruction is an ancient and normal mental process, “a 
practice engaged in by anyone who for some reason is struck by the oddity of 
 
55. Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob provide a pithy definition of practical realism: 
Practical realists are stuck in a contingent world, using language to point to objects 
outside themselves about which they can be knowledgeable because they use 
language. . . .  More important, practical realism thwarts the relativists by reminding 
them that some words and conventions, however socially constructed, reach out to the 
world and give a reasonably true description of its contents. 
JOYCE APPLEBY, LYNN HUNT & MARGARET JACOB, TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 250 
(1994). 
56. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD 
THING, TOO 238–42 (1994) (arguing that although disciplinary boundaries are artificial, they are 
necessary insofar as they provide the conditions that make academic discourse possible). 
57. FISH, supra note 17, at 139–40. 
58. Id. at 145. 
156 Texas Law Review [Vol. 88:143 
 
a piece of behavior accepted uncritically by society.”59  Fish is a postmodern-
ist who clings to disciplinary norms as structures that make sense in a sea of 
general incoherence or at least radically inconsistent perspectives.  This gives 
his argument a curious cast: he embraces disciplinary practices while 
disclaiming any interest in justifying them before any external standard. 
There is much to admire in Fish’s argument and in the rhetoric that 
advances it.  He normalizes postmodernism—his humor gently mocking fear 
of the abyss.  He makes disciplinary norms seem more like valuable sign-
posts rather than betrayals of some larger truth, more havens of coherence 
than structures of oppression.  He contributes to a neo-orthodox defense of 
academic freedom as properly resting on the autonomy of scholarship by 
providing a twist to the long-standing claim that scholarship should be un-
derstood as autonomous from lay opinion.  Rather than relying on a 
scientistic belief that scholarship has a privileged relation to objective Truth 
unavailable to laymen, he argues that it has its own truths coherent and 
relevant only to insiders.  The trick has been to reestablish a claim to 
academic self-governance against a vastly different epistemological 
background. 
But his academic minimalism has the same defects here as elsewhere in 
his book.  Fish insists that higher education has no social value, no 
“extracurricular payoff.”60  In response to suggestions that a liberal education 
will foster economic, political, or cultural values, his answer is “no, no, 
no.”61  He insists that “fashioning citizens for a pluralistic society has nothing 
to do with the pursuit of truth.”62  He argues further that any such benefits 
would be only “the unintended consequences of an enterprise which, if it is 
to remain true to itself, must be entirely self-referential, must be stuck on 
itself, must have no answer whatsoever to the question, ‘what good is it?’”63  
Fish seems here to conflate persuasive arguments for the inherent value of 
liberal education, such as classically articulated by John Henry Newman, 
with the tendentious corollary that it has no extrinsic or social value.64  He 
makes two serious mistakes. 
 
59. Id. at 137. 
60. Id. at 55. 
61. Id. at 54. 
62. Id. at 120. 
63. Id. at 55. 
64. Fish rather casually appropriates Newman, acknowledging, “Cardinal Newman[’s] 
formulation . . . anticipates everything I have written here.”  Id. at 177.  Newman certainly defined 
liberal education to be the training of the intellect for its own sake, but, unlike Fish, he also 
advocated it both for what it gave the student and for what it contributed to society.  He thought that 
a liberal education could develop the character of a “gentleman,” that it engendered, “a cultivated 
intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in 
the conduct of life.”  JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY 89 (Frank M. Turner ed., 
Yale Univ. Press 1996) (1899).  Newman also defended it for its broad usefulness in society: “[A] 
cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself, brings with it a power and a grace to every work 
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First, American higher education is imbedded in a democratic society, 
upon which it depends for financial, moral, and political support.  The unique 
legal structure of the American university, where legal control rests with lay 
trustees, encapsulates this tension.65  This arrangement developed at the very 
beginning because of the difficulty of founding new schools without 
resources,66 but it also expressed a Protestant urge for lay control over the 
clerical privilege that characterized faculty-governed English universities.67  
Similarly, the spur to state universities provided by the Morrill Act68 and 
many subsequent federal programs and the historic generosity of state legis-
latures have always been justified by the contributions to the practical value 
of new and more widely dispersed knowledge.69  Such structures indicate that 
academic work must always justify itself to the wider public.  If academic 
practices have no relation to larger concerns of life, why should a trustee, 
taxpayer, or parent provide resources to carry them on?  The professional 
norm of academic freedom mediates between the scholar’s need to pursue 
academic criteria as ends in themselves and the public’s desire to secure 
socially valuable outcomes.  Indeed, public support for academic freedom 
rests on the belief that giving faculty their professional freedom will result in 
valuable knowledge and a better prepared citizenry.  Finkin and Post cor-
rectly argue, “In the long run, public support for academic freedom will 
endure as long as the public need for the creation of such knowledge.”70 
Second, Fish is wrong that a liberal education does not contribute to 
developing citizenship.  A pluralistic and democratic society can be 
distinguished from a fundamentalist or authoritarian one by persistent, 
 
and occupation which it undertakes, and enables us to be more useful, and to a greater number.”  Id. 
at 119. 
65. Fish’s rigid disjuncture between academic work and wider values also leads him to make 
some repulsive arguments about university governance.  He argues against universities making any 
ethical judgments in their nonacademic operations, such as retailing embossed merchandise 
produced by sweated labor.  “[B]usiness questions . . . should be decided in business terms, not in 
terms of global equity.”  FISH, supra note 17, at 31.  Maintenance workers should be paid “the 
lowest possible wages.”  Id.  Such practices would soon alienate both internal and external 
constituencies upon which universities depend. 
66. See Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment 
Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 951–52 (2009) (describing 
how early American universities did not follow the English model of faculty governing boards 
simply because there were not enough scholars in the New World to reproduce it). 
67. See FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 25 (“[I]n America nonscholars retained the right to 
decide what should and should not be taught, what should and should not be published.”). 
68. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–308 
(2006)).  The Act provided federal land grants to states to develop universities “where the leading 
object shall be . . . to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic 
arts . . . .”  7 U.S.C. § 304. 
69. On the historic role of utilitarian goals in higher education, see LAWRENCE R. VEYSEY, THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, 57–120 (1965). 
70. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 42; see also LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 
417 (2001) (claiming that American society has accepted the AAUP’s position that it should abstain 
from interfering in university affairs out of its own self-interest in preserving disinterested 
scholarship). 
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competing arguments about both ends and means, respect for facts, and a 
willingness to revise assumptions.  Commitments to rationality and freedom 
necessarily intertwine.  A liberal education aims to teach people to engage 
arguments independently and critically, to separate good reasons from 
bullshit,71 and, crucially, to be open to revise their own positions upon 
learning new facts or hearing persuasive arguments.72  These are the methods 
of every academic discipline and essential learning for the leaders in the kind 
of society we wish to be.73  Students studying Milton with Professor Fish will 
learn the sophisticated questions and methods of contemporary literary 
criticism, but they also will learn more generally how to make and critique 
arguments about their cultural tradition.  The Supreme Court’s “special 
concern” for academic freedom may well be based on such a view.74  Justice 
Brennan wrote, “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through 
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas . . . ‘rather than any kind of 
authoritative selection.’”75  Chief Justice Warren also wrote, “Teachers and 
students must always remain free to inquire, to study, and to evaluate, to gain 
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and 
die.”76  Such statements, as well as innumerable others delivered by 
university presidents over the years, employ a somewhat hyperbolic rhetoric.  
But they also convey a faith that the methods of scholarship and education 
within the university provide a crucial model for thinking and discourse and 
training for participation in a liberal society.  The university is a holy place 
for a liberal society, one where the larger society’s values about discourse 
and knowledge are observed in a purer manner, which serves both as a 
release from and reproach to the compromised realities of politics and 
interests.77  Fish offers an impoverished defense of higher education by 
denying its social value. 
 
71. See generally HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005) (describing “bullshit” as a 
distinctive form of misrepresentation). 
72. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF 
REFORM IN LIBERAL EDUCATION, 36 (1997) (“Logical analysis is at the heart of democratic 
political culture.”). 
73. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 335–38 (espousing the value liberal education contributes to 
society).  The literature on this is vast, from Thomas Jefferson to Amy Gutmann.  See, e.g., 
THOMAS JEFFERSON ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 
(1818), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 457, 459–60 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) 
(listing various objects of education, including the need “[t]o develop the reasoning faculties of our 
youth, enlarge their minds, cultivate their morals, and instill into them the precepts of virtue and 
order”); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 172–93 (1987) (extolling the democratic 
purposes served by higher education). 
74. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to 
safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned.  That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which 
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”). 
75. Id. 
76. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
77. Amy Gutmann aptly captures the analogous theme of serving democracy by being set aside 
from it: 
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III. Responding to Critics 
Both books embrace the 1915 Declaration’s emphasis on scholarly 
expertise to deflect or refute criticism of university faculties for leftist bias.  
Complaints about “tenured radicals” have waxed and waned for two decades 
now, to some extent within the university but far more virulently from 
outside.78  Rightist pundits have gained traction in public opinion by 
combining hair-raising anecdotes about faculty politicizing classrooms with 
caricatures of postmodernism that reduce it to claims that all knowledge 
represents structures of oppression by powerful entities.79  Whatever the 
merits of specific complaints, the overall impetus seems more part of a larger 
political and cultural struggle than considered critiques of new trends in 
scholarship and teaching.80  Some critics have argued that state legislators 
and trustees need to step in to restore traditional academic values abandoned 
by faculty themselves.  They have advocated for legislative or administrative 
mandates that faculties represent the entire political spectrum and that 
 
Universities are more likely to serve society well not by adopting the quantified values 
of the market but by preserving a realm where the nonquantifiable values of 
intellectual excellence and integrity, and the supporting moral principles of 
nonrepression and nondiscrimination, flourish.  In serving society well by preserving 
such a realm, a university acts as an educator of officeholders rather than simply a 
gatekeeper of office. 
GUTMANN, supra note 73, at 183. 
78. See, e.g., ROBERT O’NEIL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE WIRED WORLD 79–81 (2008) 
(describing several comments made by professors post-9/11 that raised the ire of state legislators, 
alumni, and citizens-at-large to a much greater degree than they did among the administration and 
faculty). 
79. See, e.g., DINESH D’SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON 
CAMPUS (1991) (suggesting that various diversity and multiculturalism efforts instituted by 
American universities, while well-intentioned, are ultimately misplaced and even 
counterproductive); DAVID HOROWITZ, THE PROFESSORS: THE 101 MOST DANGEROUS 
ACADEMICS IN AMERICA (2006) (arguing that the modern university has been politicized by 
primarily left-leaning academics and stressing the need to remove political bias from higher 
education); ALAN CHARLES KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: A 
BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON AMERICA’S CAMPUSES (1998) (complaining that many modern 
universities curtail their students’ liberties by forcing upon them certain, mostly left-leaning, 
ideological beliefs and suppressing dissent, particularly that which is socially or politically 
unpopular).  The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education carries on the tedious struggle, 
fanning occasional trivial disputes about marginal student speech without intellectual value.  See 
FIRE: The Found. for Individual Rights in Educ., http://www.thefire.org/ (contending that various 
universities have curtailed assorted forms of politically and socially controversial speech by 
students and student organizations). 
80. See id. at 92–94 (comparing the diminution of academic freedom during the McCarthy Era 
and the period since 9/11).  While these critics do express some understandable concerns, adequate 
explanation of the intensity of their rhetoric will require a historian of political ideas possessing the 
sensitivity to social psychology of a Richard Hofstadter.  Cf. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE 
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 29–30 (1965) (“The paranoid 
spokesman sees the fate of this [vast and sinister] conspiracy in apocalyptic terms—he traffics in the 
birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values.  He is 
always manning the barricades of civilization.”). 
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individual teachers present all sides of controversial matters.81  Such political 
intervention to correct university teaching would surely violate academic 
freedom as a raw “governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a 
university.”82 
These campaigns have failed politically to achieve their stated goals; no 
legislature or private board has instituted agencies to oversee faculty 
appointments.  But their charged portrayals of academic excess probably 
have undermined public confidence in the integrity of teaching and 
scholarship, and in university self-governance.  Even some sophisticated 
federal judges rely on these exaggerated accounts to urge active judicial pro-
tection for faculty “whose method or speech is found offensive by those who 
usually dominate our institutions of higher learning.”83  In this environment, 
fundamentalist, faux universities without academic freedom or serious aca-
demic life can rise to prominence,84 and state legislatures have gradually 
withdrawn financial support from state universities.85  Both books under 
review here deploy their neo-orthodoxy regarding academic freedom and its 
underlying scholarly values to push back against demands for a new 
approach to academic speech. 
Finkin and Post’s response to calls for political balance relies on their 
reinvigoration of the standard of professional autonomy stemming from the 
1915 Declaration.  Their discussion of Committee A cases concerning politi-
cally controversial material in the classroom casts their position as the 
established academic tradition.  As a rhetorical matter this seems like a good 
move—it removes claims for autonomy from current ideological disputes.  
Finkin and Post try to persuade us that Committee A considered all these 
issues long ago within the terms of historic political controversies and 
reached modest, responsible outcomes.  They specifically argue that calls for 
political balance are “flatly incompatible with a scholar’s accountability to 
professional standards.”86  “Balance” may require biologists to present the 
case for intelligent design despite a professional consensus that it lacks 
validity.  “The whole point of academic freedom is to insulate professional 
 
81. The so-called Academic Bill of Rights and the political battles it engendered are discussed 
in J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About the “Four 
Freedoms” of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 941–44 (2006). 
82. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  For a discussion of a similar loss of 
confidence in academic leaders by the judiciary, which has resulted in a decline in constitutional 
academic freedom, see Byrne, supra note 52, at 132–33,. 
83. Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 471 (2d Cir. 2001) (Cabranes, J., dissenting).  The footnote 
accompanying this casual disparagement justifies judicial activism against universities because of 
“disheartening developments” and “the politicization of higher education” as chronicled in popular 
books.  Id. at 471 n.2. 
84. See, e.g., University Bans Club for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, at A24 
(reporting Liberty University’s banning of the College Democrats club due to its incompatibility 
with the school’s conservative Christian principles). 
85. See supra note 16. 
86. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 103. 
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judgments from this kind of crude political control.  Academic freedom 
obligates scholars to use disciplinary standards, not political standards, to 
guide their teaching.”87 
Finkin and Post plausibly show how an insistence on balance can 
undermine the scholarly values that critics claim to care for.  Their case 
contains serious weaknesses, however.  Their Committee A case discussions 
do not give the reader enough information to judge whether they have 
reported or assessed the facts and judgments fairly or have ignored internal 
conflicts; as such, the case discussions can be dismissed as superficial 
anecdotes.  The explicit arguments against balance take up only relatively 
easy issues, like creationism in a science class, rather than truly divisive 
issues, like the ethics or constitutionality of a U.S. President authorizing 
torture.  Disciplinary norms may frame but do not settle many issues that 
rage within a field; some methodological choices overlap substantially with 
political values.  While any external mandate or intrusive procedure to 
promote “balance” surely threatens indispensible academic autonomy and 
causes more harm than gain, Finkin and Post do not adequately consider 
whether the professional ethics of teaching require some level of political 
even-handedness in handling controversial matters when different positions 
are consistent with scholarly criteria.  The book more stakes a claim to the 
value of the tradition than fully establishes that it settles contemporary 
concerns. 
Fish directly engages specific critics of the university, arguing that they 
violate academic norms as much or more than the dreaded tenured radicals 
they abhor.  He has serious fun with claims associating postmodernism with 
immorality and left-wing politics: “[P]ostmodernism is a series of arguments, 
not a way of life or a recipe for action.”88  He skewers pundit William 
Bennett, for example, arguing that, by calling for a reinstatement of truth and 
honesty in history, Bennett “means a study of history that tells the same story 
he and his friends would tell if they were in control of the nation’s history 
departments.”89 
This is great fun and convincing up to a point.  Its weakness stems 
from Fish’s reductive minimalism.  At bottom, Fish’s defense of academic 
autonomy rests on his claims that academic work does not engage larger 
social issues.  But, we cannot and should not confine the values served by 
higher education to those that contribute directly to disciplinary goals, like 
the prohibition of plagiarism.90  American universities were founded and 
continue to embrace values not subsumed in disciplinary criteria.  As 
discussed above, the most persistent claim is that they foster democracy by 
 
87. Id. at 103–04. 
88. FISH, supra note 17, at 141. 
89. Id. at 142. 
90. Fish expressly argues that “the whole of academic morality” consists of those prohibitions 
implicit in immanent rationality, such as against cheating, fraud, and plagiarism.  Id. at 101–02. 
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educating leaders to engage arguments on their merits rather than resort to 
force or lies: the mutually supporting commitments of a liberal education and 
liberal society.  But most schools have other commitments as well.  My own 
institution has endeavored over many years to interpret its heritage as a 
Catholic and Jesuit university with unstinting commitment to academic 
freedom, arguably improving the education it offers because of those 
values.91  Law schools, too, educate students for activity in the world, often 
combining scholarly analysis of legal issues with skills development and an 
ethical commitment to justice integral to professionalism.92 
Fish ignores the extent to which the actual traditions of American 
higher education neither can nor should be fully separate from public values.  
Practically speaking, most constituents of universities may care as much or 
more for the attachment to these values than for disciplinary norms.  Critics 
of undergraduate education persistently call for greater curricular coherence, 
which requires some subordination of disciplinary norms to educational or 
ethical goals.93  External criticisms of trends in scholarship or the quality of 
teaching will not be silenced by Fish’s claims that academic work has no 
bearing on society.  The tension between disciplinary norms and social 
demands has fueled the dynamism of American universities.94  Material and 
moral support for teaching and scholarship depends on the belief that they 
contribute to some notions of social good. 
 
91. The Jesuit notions of cura personalis and “educating the whole person” represent the 
antithesis of Fish’s exclusive concentration on disciplinary training.  See Georgetown Univ., 
Mission and Ministry, http://www11.georgetown.edu/omm/spiritofgeorgetown.html.  The signif-
icance of a Catholic and Jesuit identity for a modern university has been the subject of rich and 
intense debate for many years.  See JOHN C. HAUGHEY, WHERE IS KNOWING GOING?  THE 
HORIZONS OF THE KNOWING SUBJECT 61–87 (2009) (examining the history of and relationship 
between the “Catholic intellectual tradition” and the “Catholic Sacred Tradition”); Joseph A. 
Komonchak, The Catholic University in the Church, in CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES IN CHURCH AND 
SOCIETY: A DIALOGUE ON EX CORDE ECCLESIAE 47–48 (John P. Langan ed., 1993) (suggesting that 
there is a logical and ecclesiological rationale for academic liberty).  Michael J. Buckley, for 
example, argues that such schools necessarily have commitments to the free and open discussion of 
all subjects and the promotion of justice.  MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY AS 
PROMISE AND PROJECT: REFLECTIONS IN A JESUIT IDIOM 125–47 (1998). 
92. The American Bar Association accredits law schools and requires that every school provide 
substantial instruction in professional ethics and substantial opportunities for pro bono 
representation of low-income people.  AM. BAR ASS’N, 2009–2010 ABA STANDARDS FOR 
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 21–23 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/ 
2009-2010%20StandardsWebContent/Chapter3.pdf.  My law school’s motto is carved on the 
exterior wall of the library: “Law is but the means—Justice is the end.”  Georgetown Law—The 
E.B. Williams Law Library (Campus Tour), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/tour/library.html (last 
revised Jan. 21, 2005). 
93. See, e.g., ERNEST L. BOYER, COLLEGE: THE UNDERGRADUATE EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 
83–101 (1987) (calling for a more coherent curriculum that relates general education to different 
subject-matter disciplines and the outside world). 
94. Former Yale President Giamatti warned that universities that seek to be “sanctuaries from 
society” deserve scorn.  A. BARTLETT GIAMATTI, A FREE AND ORDERED SPACE: THE REAL 
WORLD OF THE UNIVERSITY 50 (1990) (“To wish only to be removed from the culture, and not to 
be part of its renewal, is to long for the atrophy, not the exercise, of the imagination and its 
works.”). 
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The inevitable and desirable entanglement of higher education with 
social goals and values makes academic freedom even more important.  
Entrusting the evaluation of teaching and scholarship to disciplinary peers 
provides insulation (not isolation) for intellectual accomplishment from the 
pursuit of moral or practical ends by trustees or administrators.  Academic 
freedom provides a safety valve regulating the interplay between disciplinary 
criteria and the broader concerns of the university, protecting the highly 
structured search for scholarly truth that engenders intellectual integrity to 
multifarious projects of the modern university.  The absence of hierarchical 
command and the lateral distribution of authority required by academic free-
dom render any integration of disciplinary criteria and educational or social 
values only partial and periodic.  Ordinary academic work needs to and can 
go forward without interference, but academics occasionally do need to argue 
beyond their fields that their work has both intellectual merit and social 
value.  This dialogue is explicit in the scientific grants process and also im-
plicit in the legal control of universities by nonacademics.  Tension among 
the goals of higher education has mostly been creative, and academic 
freedom protects intellectual integrity from being overwhelmed by more 
immediate or popular concerns. 
IV. Legal Implications: The Paradox of Garcetti 
While neither book purports to wrestle with legal issues as such, their 
treatment of the norm of academic freedom has important implications for its 
constitutional status.  As indicated above, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Garcetti tees up the question whether the First Amendment protects faculty 
from reprisals by their institutions for speech within the duties of their job.95  
The Court there held that a county prosecutor would not be protected from 
adverse actions by his superiors in the office in response to a “disposition 
memo” prepared as part of his official duties.96  The Justices thus established 
another limitation on the right of a public employee to address matters of 
public concern without reprisals by their government employer.97  In dissent, 
Justice Souter expressed the “hope that today’s majority does not mean to 
imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges 
and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant 
to . . . official duties.’”98  The Court in response, however, explicitly saved 
for future consideration whether such a limitation on the scope of employee 
 
95. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (“There is some argument that 
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech 
jurisprudence.”). 
96. Id. at 424. 
97. See id. (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). 
98. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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freedom of speech should apply to academic scholarship or teaching.99  A 
few lower courts have applied the Garcetti rule to professors without dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s reservation about doing so, but only in the 
context of governance disputes rather than in teaching or scholarship.100 
Both Finkin and Post’s and Fish’s books help explain why the teaching 
and scholarship of a university professor enjoy a different relation to First 
Amendment values than does the speech of other professionals working 
within hierarchical public organizations.  Garcetti assumes plausibly that 
many supervisors need to control the speech of their subordinates, so speech 
within the sphere of one’s employment lacks the values attributed to speech 
by citizens.101  Fish illuminates how the different nature of a professor’s job 
requires a different structure of authority: 
The limited freedom academics do enjoy follows from the task they 
perform.  That task—extending the boundaries of received 
knowledge—does not have a pre-established goal; the open-endedness 
of intellectual inquiry demands a degree of flexibility not granted to 
the practitioners of other professions, who must be responsive to the 
customer, or to the bottom line, or to the electorate, or to the global 
economy.102 
Scholarship is carried out by highly trained individuals employing 
methodology and responding to prior work within (or near) organized 
disciplines, and subjecting the product to professional criticism and peer 
review.  A professor cannot be considered an organ of the state; indeed, a 
scholar’s primary duty is to the truth, which would be betrayed by following 
any official state line established by any superior.  The 1915 Declaration 
 
99. See id. at 425 (majority opinion) (“We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether 
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to 
scholarship or teaching.”). 
100. Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2008) (characterizing Renken’s speech 
as that of a public employee rather than a private citizen because registering a grant falls within the 
teaching and service duties that he was employed to perform); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 
1165–66 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (defining the key issue as whether Hong’s statements were made 
pursuant to his official duties as a faculty member, without first questioning whether faculty 
members should be evaluated under the Garcetti rule).  In Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 
2009), the court applied the Garcetti rule to a professor’s statements in various governance and 
administrative disputes, finding that his “actions so clearly were not ‘speech related to scholarship 
or teaching,’” and noting that “such a determination here does not ‘imperil First Amendment 
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities.’”  Id. at 186 (quoting Garcetti, 
547 U.S. at 425; id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted)).  The extension of 
Garcetti to universities threatens shared governance.  See Areen, supra note 66, at 1000 
(“[Extending] the holding of Garcetti to faculty at public colleges and universities [will] thereby 
effectively eliminate constitutional protection for their scholarship, teaching, and governance 
activities.”). 
101. Dean Post has written several sophisticated articles explicating the differences for First 
Amendment purposes between the realms of public discourse and that of government managerial 
authority.  E.g., Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of 
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). 
102. FISH, supra note 17, at 81–82. 
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expressed this sense that professors do not serve within a chain of command, 
insisting that they are “appointees” not “employees.”103  Professors’ work 
requires independent judgment and expression, subject to evaluation by peers 
who apply academic criteria that largely transcend any local peculiarities, the 
cosmopolitan standards for an academic discipline practiced across the nation 
and often around the world.  Hierarchical control of speech defeats the goals 
of scholarship and liberal education, so universities have quite different 
systems for coordination of effort. 
The Garcetti formulation turns the principle of academic freedom on its 
head.  The First Amendment, as expounded in Garcetti, protects only a 
public employee’s speech as a citizen outside professional duties.104  
Academic freedom essentially protects only academic speech within the 
sphere of a professor’s professional responsibilities; any extension to the 
professor’s speech as a citizen outside his or her professional duties is deriv-
ative and debatable.  Fish captures the nub of this in his argument that when 
professors speak on topics outside their academic competence, they have no 
more claim to authority than anyone else; thus, academic freedom should 
give them no more and no less liberty than anyone else.105  While professors 
at public universities long have enjoyed the same First Amendment 
protections for extramural speech as other public employees, academic 
freedom addressed the conditions necessary for success in teaching and 
scholarship, the core of professional duties.  No wonder the Supreme Court 
hesitated!  From this perspective, the Garcetti rule perversely eviscerates 
academic freedom by depriving it of any constitutional protection. 
Finkin and Post take a somewhat different tact; they argue that 
academic freedom does protect the “extramural” speech of an academic from 
institutional reprisal.106  Their view tracks the AAUP position, which has 
evolved from some waffling in the 1915 Declaration, when the First 
Amendment did not protect any speech by government employees, to its 
definite 1970 interpretation that “a faculty member’s expression of opinion 
as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly demon-
strates the faculty member’s unfitness for the position.”107  Finkin and Post 
incorporate citizen speech within academic freedom because professors at 
private universities cannot invoke the First Amendment against their 
institutions.108  They forthrightly acknowledge that the rationales for 
academic freedom itself, professional competence and autonomy, do not 
 
103. See 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 295 (proclaiming that members of university 
faculties are the appointees, rather than the employees, of the university trustees). 
104. 547 U.S. at 421. 
105. FISH, supra note 17, at 82. 
106. See FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 7 (arguing that First Amendment rights and academic 
freedom are separate rights, and that extramural speech is a distinct dimension of academic 
freedom). 
107. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 6. 
108. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 132–33. 
166 Texas Law Review [Vol. 88:143 
 
directly justify protection of speech outside a professor’s realm of 
competence.109  Rather, they argue that extending academic freedom to 
extramural speech provides “prophylactic protection” for core freedom in 
scholarship and teaching; it fosters a “climate of trust and autonomy 
necessary for faculty to contribute optimally to the mission of higher 
education.”110  While this argument has practical merit, it recognizes, as does 
Fish’s, that academic freedom arises from and has been shaped by 
professional requirements for teaching and scholarship. 
So the Garcetti limitation would seem to be inconsistent with academic 
freedom.  But the issue is not that simple.  The freedom that citizens have 
under the First Amendment also may be inconsistent with academic freedom, 
which not only tolerates but requires that peers evaluate the quality of speech 
on the merits and penalize professionally those found lacking.  Finkin and 
Post recognize that the professional criteria for academic speech, requiring 
methodological care, hardly resembles the “‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open’ speech that characterizes the public debate of citizens.”111  They argue 
further that the First Amendment presumes that every person has an equal 
right of expression, but “this premise is inconsistent with the advancement of 
knowledge, which requires precisely that ideas be treated unequally, that they 
be assessed and weighted, accepted and rejected.  The kind of individual 
freedom that underlies the structure of the First Amendment is . . . ill suited 
to the production of knowledge.”112  Within academic freedom, individual 
teachers are subject to “retaliation” for weaknesses in speech within their 
professional duties, so long as the judgment is made by academic peers pur-
suant to appropriate procedures.113  Both books stress the inherently 
professional purposes and limitations of academic freedom, demonstrating 
that it arises from the logic of scholarly and educational purposes rather than 
being deduced from the principles that justify free-speech protections for 
citizens in a democracy.  That is the neo-orthodoxy that they revive, which 
restores the coherence of academic freedom.  Entrusting the elaboration and 
application of such inherently academic principles to judges and juries 
threatens the intellectual system that the principles exist to foster. 
The public-employee free-speech cases before Garcetti frequently were 
absurd, as courts and juries struggled to decide whether some professor’s 
writing or utterance touched on a matter of “public concern.”114  But this is 
 
109. Id. at 135–36. 
110. Id. at 140. 
111. Id. at 135 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
112. Id. at 43. 
113. See id. at 59 (explaining how universities employ peer-review procedures in making hiring 
and tenure decisions). 
114. See Byrne, supra note 52, at 108–09 (detailing the inconsistent application of the “public 
concern” test).  Compare Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(“[C]lassroom instruction will often fall within the Supreme Court’s broad conception of ‘public 
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the wrong question being answered by the wrong persons.  Academic free-
dom insists that academic work be evaluated only for its professional value 
by other scholars competent to make such a judgment.  These First 
Amendment cases bring academic work to the bar of public opinion, but the 
thrust of academic freedom is to protect it from the force of public opinion.  
As Finkin and Post state, “[T]here is a fundamental distinction between 
holding faculty accountable to professional norms and holding them account-
able to public opinion.  The former exemplifies academic freedom; the latter 
undermines it.”115 
Of course, constitutional adjudication involves more than public 
opinion.  But the First Amendment, interpreted by judges and applied by 
juries, will slight academic values in favor of civic values.  For this reason, I 
long have argued that constitutional academic freedom protects primarily the 
university as an institution from government interference with core academic 
functions.116  Thus, the academic freedom of the individual professor should 
be left to nonlegal academic and institutional arrangements, such as the 
tenure system; the investigations and judgments of Committee A of AAUP; 
and the professional incentives and ethics of professors, academic 
administrators, and even trustees.117  Legalizing disputes about the appro-
priateness of teaching and scholarship empowers their resolution by 
nonacademics.  Judges can protect the system of academic freedom by 
protecting the institutional autonomy of universities from inappropriate intru-
sions by political actors.  When they settle disputes among academics about 
collective and individual authority, such as departmental control over 
curriculum or grading, or the reasonableness of tenure decisions, they tend to 
replace academic with civic norms.118 
The remedial purpose of adjudication also may be unsuitable for the 
vindication of academic freedom.  Both books emphasize that academic free-
dom protects the system of scholarship and teaching rather than protecting 
the individual interests of each professor.  Finkin and Post state, “If the First 
Amendment protects the interests of individual persons to speak as they 
wish, academic freedom protects the interests of society in having a 
professoriat that can accomplish its mission.”119  Fish argues that a teacher 
“violates academic freedom by deciding to set aside academic purposes for 
 
concern.’”), with Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F. Supp. 1425, 1443 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (“Course content is 
not a matter of public concern.”). 
115. FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 154. 
116. Byrne, supra note 6, at 255. 
117. Id. at 307–11. 
118. See FINKIN & POST, supra note 1, at 154 (“[T]here is a fundamental difference between 
holding faculty accountable to professional norms and holding them accountable to public 
opinion.”).  Judicial scrutiny of a professor’s nonprofessional speech against institutional retaliation 
ordinarily does not threaten peer review. 
119. Id. at 39. 
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others thought to be more noble or urgent.”120  This tilt is strongly evident in 
Committee A reports, which examine and recommend changes in institu-
tional decision-making processes rather than seek remedies for wronged 
individuals.  The system of academic freedom is more important than any 
individual professor.  Redressing wrongs to individuals is humane but not 
necessary to preserve the functioning of the beneficial system.121  Employing 
an outside force such as a court may secure redress in one case but weaken or 
destroy the system. 
Garcetti may provide the right rule for professional speech by 
professors, but for reasons different than those for hierarchical organizations.  
Academic freedom as a norm and practice already protects individual profes-
sors from arbitrary or politically motivated retaliation.  The exemplary 
Committee A reports recounted by Finkin and Post demonstrate how well 
academics can resolve their own disputes.  First Amendment litigation risks 
bringing unsuitable principles and practices to bear on a well-functioning 
informal system.  Finkin and Post, nonetheless, likely would resist 
Garcetti—and for good reasons.  Although we largely agree on the neo-
orthodox principles that justify academic freedom, they take a different 
approach to implementing them.  While they justifiably extol the virtues of 
Committee A’s work, AAUP leaders know the practical barriers to fostering 
academic freedom without judicial protection.  Faculty at leading institutions 
take it for granted, while many of those at more marginal institutions serve as 
adjuncts without the protections of tenure or even regularity.122  The AAUP 
has been weakened.  Economic pressures encourage institutions to curtail 
faculty privileges, promote “business methods,” and fear conflict with 
funders.123  Indeed, their book can be read as an attempt to salvage the 
 
120. FISH, supra note 17, at 81. 
121. A university that adheres to academic freedom, of course, must provide academic due 
process to individuals through peer review and faculty-grievance procedures.  See generally AM. 
ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS ON ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM & TENURE (2006), http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/43B77A60-BA80-4155-B61B-
FF76743B5048/0/RecommendedInstitutionalRegulationsonAcademicFreedomandTenure.pdf 
(outlining the AAUP’s model tenure, grievance, and dismissal procedures). 
122. See EMILY FORREST CATALDI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2004 NATIONAL STUDY OF 
POSTSECONDARY FACULTY: BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS, WORK ACTIVITIES, AND 
COMPENSATION OF INSTRUCTIONAL FACULTY AND STAFF: FALL 2003, at 7 tbl.1, 13 tbl.7 (2005) 
(reporting that only 5% of part-time faculty have any tenure opportunity, and that the percentages of 
part-time faculty in various institutions were 22% at public doctoral institutions, 31% at private not-
for-profit doctoral institutions, 37% at public master’s and private not-for-profit baccalaureate 
institutions, 55% at private not-for-profit master’s institutions, 67% at public associate’s 
institutions, and 51% at all other types of institutions); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom of Part-
Time Faculty, 27 J.C. & U.L. 583, 592 (2001) (“Part-time faculty cannot enjoy as full a protection 
for academic freedom as do full-time faculty . . . because they are too far removed from the system 
of peer review.”). 
123. See, e.g., Naomi Schaefer Riley, Tenure and Academic Freedom: College Campuses 
Display a Striking Uniformity of Thought, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2009, at A3 (describing a failed 
plan by the Metropolitan College of Denver to ease the firing of tenured professors to control 
education costs). 
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principles that have animated the AAUP’s approach to academic freedom for 
application in new contexts. 
Although these books well serve academic freedom by clarifying the 
values upon which it is based and the purposes that it serves, neither offers a 
sense of how to strengthen and preserve that system.  Fish offers little more 
than arguments to individuals about how to behave.  His interest in 
institutional arrangements amounts to arguments that administrators should 
pretend to listen to faculty and that faculty should treat administrators more 
respectfully.  He does not offer helpful suggestions about how to provide 
incentives or compel academics to abide by the academic ideals he 
passionately advocates.  Although they are legal experts, Finkin and Post also 
concentrate on principles.  Their discussion of process and jurisdiction is 
backward-looking to what the AAUP has accomplished.  The effectiveness 
of what they accomplished leaves us wanting all the more their detailed 
engagement with the institutional choices that can safeguard those principles. 
The looming question posed by Garcetti of the relation between our 
tradition of academic freedom and the First Amendment makes the need to 
address these issues acute.  Those who worry that judicial enforcement of 
individual academic freedom against public institutions will undermine the 
values intended to be protected need most to suggest alternatives.  Here are a 
few suggestions.  First, judicial enforcement of constitutional academic 
freedom as a right of universities themselves to be free from political 
interference in their core academic functions creates space where academics 
can govern those matters embraced by our tradition of academic freedom.  
Second, this right of institutional autonomy can be shaped to provide 
incentives for the governors of universities to adhere to the tradition of 
academic freedom.  For example, I have argued that a systematic institutional 
failure to follow the tradition of academic freedom should deprive an 
institution of the status of a university and the constitutional shield that 
accompanies it.124  Third, faculty members must either support the reform 
efforts of the AAUP or create a new organization to perform its vital 
functions.  As noted above, membership in AAUP has decreased, and some 
feel that its unionization efforts are inconsistent with its role as guardian of 
academic freedom.125  Nonetheless, the AAUP has taken significant steps 
recently to address these issues.126  Although some disciplinary associations, 
such as the Association of American Law Schools, have made useful efforts 
 
124. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 338 (“[C]onstitutional academic freedom ought not to protect 
institutions resembling universities but which do not . . . respect the academic freedom of 
professors . . . or the essential intellectual freedom of students . . . .”). 
125. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 15 (“Others believe that the AAUP’s union activities corrupt 
its high-minded professional policies [such as protecting academic freedom].”). 
126. See generally Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Resources on Academic Freedom, 
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/newsroom/ (providing recent policy statements, reports, and analysis 
on pressing issues). 
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to address academic freedom,127 faculty need an organization that transcends 
disciplines and holds academic freedom as its central mission in engaging 
with ever larger and more powerful higher-education administrations.  Those 
who think courts are the answer should address the concern expressed ably 
by the 1915 Declaration itself, that judgments about the scope of academic 
freedom should not “be vested in bodies not composed of members of the 
academic profession.”128 
V. Conclusion 
American universities are dazzlingly diverse, full of conflicting 
purposes, and the envy of the world.129  Our norm of academic freedom has 
grown out of the needs and power structures of our universities to safeguard 
the intellectual excellence at the core of their success.  Rather than a civil 
liberty or an individual interest, academic freedom systematically preserves 
the precedence of professional judgment about what counts as success in 
scholarship and teaching.  As such it protects knowledge and the search for 
truth, as well as we can collectively establish it.  The academic work of a 
university provides an exemplar for a liberal society, which values address-
ing issues on the merits and supporting leaders who appropriately 
acknowledge facts and respond to conflicting arguments. 
The books under review make impressive contributions to 
understanding academic freedom and its relation to the search for truth.  
Finkin and Post hold out reasonable hope that the traditional approach of the 
AAUP to controversies about academic freedom provides enduring prin-
ciples that preserve professional standards while permitting individual 
creativity and adapting to new methods.  I wish they had gone further in 
defending their approach and placing it within current controversies and 
institutional arrangements.  Fish argues for a faculty role limited to perform-
ing core professional competencies, the better to exclude from academic 
decision making those with political agendas.  While he is half right—we 
must teach our subjects as matters of intellectual inquiry—he unjustifiably 
denies much that makes university education valuable to students and to 
society at large.  Both books clarify what is distinct and precious about 
academic freedom, and we need to get those principles right to successfully 
apply them in law or new institutional structures. 
 
127. The AALS Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure investigates complaints in a 
manner analogous to that of Committee A of the AAUP, but its proceedings are largely confidential.  
See Executive Committee Regulations of the Association of American Law Schools, ch. 4, 
http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_regulations.php#4 (providing the Committee’s procedures for 
resolving complaints). 
128. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 1, at 174. 
129. Drew Gilpin Faust, The University’s Crisis of Purpose, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2009, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/books/review/Faust-t.html. 
